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THE MESS THAT HAS BECOME INDIAN GAMING IN
OKLAHOMA
Lucas Meacham*
I. Introduction
Since its enactment in 1988, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
has permitted American Indian tribes to conduct gaming within the United
States.1 In return, tribes have entered into agreements with state
governments for the payment of exclusivity fees under various revenue
sharing arrangements, which have provided substantial economic support
for non-tribal governments. 2 In 2014, total outputs stemming from tribal
gaming amounted to over $96.6 billion. 3 Gaming generated $16 billion in
federal, state, and local government tax revenues. 4 Oklahoma, in particular,
generated $2.1 billion in tax revenues from tribal gaming.5 Needless to say,
tribal gaming provides states, especially Oklahoma, with vital economic
benefits. Accordingly, it is important that states and tribes have coherent
relationships that govern this critical economic activity.
For over fifteen years, the Oklahoma State Tribal Gaming Act (“STGA”)
has governed these relationships in Oklahoma. 6 The STGA offered
“federally recognized” tribes within Oklahoma the ability to enter into a
Model Compact under which the tribes could, subject to federal approval,
engage in Class III gaming activities. 7 However, recent action by Oklahoma
Governor Kevin Stitt, the Comanche Nation, the Otoe-Missouria Tribe, the
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians (“UKB”), and the Kialegee
Tribal Town (“KTT”)8 has threatened to upend this fifteen-year
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
2. ALAN MEISTER, NATHAN ASSOCS., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRIBAL GAMING: A
STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 17-18 (2017), https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/
files/Economic%20Impact%20of%20Indian%20Gaming%20in%20the%20U.S.%20Septem
ber%202017.pdf (report prepared for the American Gaming Association).
3. Id. at 5.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 280 (West 2018).
7. Id. §§ 280-281.
8. See Press Release, Okla. Governor J. Kevin Stitt, KTT and UKB Tribal Gaming
Compacts Deemed Approved by the Department of Interior (Aug. 20, 2020) [hereinafter
Press Release, Gaming Compacts Deemed Approved], https://oklahoma.gov/governor/
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relationship. Following Governor Stitt’s public challenge to the renewal of
the Model Compacts and resulting litigation over the renewal clause in the
Model Compacts, the Comanche Nation, Otoe-Missouria Tribe, UKB, and
KTT (the “Defendant Tribes”) all entered into new agreements (the “New
Compacts”) with the state that purported to replace the existing Model
Compacts with new agreements. 9 The New Compacts, entered into on
behalf of the state by Governor Stitt, significantly altered the rights of the
state and the compacting tribes while negatively impacting the tribes who
remained bound by the original compacts and greatly expanding the scope
of gaming in Oklahoma.10 Primarily, the New Compacts altered the fee
schedules the tribes are required to pay.11 Additionally, the compacts
negotiated by the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribe in particular
allowed for sports betting, which is not permissible under Oklahoma law. 12
Importantly, the New Compacts allowed the Defendant Tribes to potentially
expand their gaming operations into more favorable metropolitan locations
in or near the jurisdictions of other Oklahoma tribes, which was not allowed
under the Model Compacts.13
These actions have been met with fierce opposition from other tribes
within the state as well as members of the state government. As a result, a
string of legal actions have been filed. First, following an op-ed by
Governor Stitt challenging the renewal clause in the Model Compacts and a
failure by the Attorney General to negotiate new compact terms, the
Cherokee Nation, the Chickasaw Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and the
Citizen Potawatomi Nation (the “Plaintiff Tribes”), filed a federal lawsuit in
the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against Governor
newsroom/newsroom/2020/august/ktt-and-ukb-tribal-gaming-compacts-deemed-approvedby-the-depart.html; see also Press Release, Okla. Governor J. Kevin Stitt, Gov. Stitt Signs
Two New Gaming Compacts with the Otoe-Missouria Tribe and Comanche Nation (Apr. 21,
2020) [hereinafter Press Release, Gov. Stitt Signs Two New Gaming Compacts],
https://oklahoma.gov/governor/newsroom/newsroom/2020/april/gov--stitt-signs-two-newgaming-compacts-with-the-otoe-missouria.html.
9. See Press Release, Gov. Stitt Signs Two New Gaming Compacts, supra note 8.
10. See id.
11. Compare 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 280 (West 2018), with Otoe-Missouria Tribe and
State of Oklahoma Gaming Compact (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.indianaffairs.gov/sites/
bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/pdf/508%20Compliant%202020.06.29%20Otoe%20Missouria
%20Tribe%20Gaming%20Compact.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YV8-L3T2], and Comanche
Nation and State of Oklahoma Gaming Compact (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.bia.
gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/pdf/508%20Compliant%202020.06.29%20Comanche
%20Nation%20Gaming%20Compact.pdf [https://perma.cc/J639-92GQ].
12. 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 280 (West 2018).
13. See Press Release, Gov. Stitt Signs Two New Gaming Compacts, supra note 8.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol46/iss1/5

No. 1]

NOTES

157

Stitt seeking to enforce a renewal clause embedded in the Model
Compacts.14 The federal judge ruled the renewal clause was enforceable,
thus the Model Compacts were automatically renewed for another fifteen
years.15
While the suit in the Western District of Oklahoma was pending,
Governor Stitt entered into New Compacts with the Defendant Tribes in
what could be construed as an attempt to undermine the efforts of the
Plaintiff Tribes in the Western District of Oklahoma. 16 The New Compacts
prompted Oklahoma Senate President Pro Tempore, Greg Treat, and
Speaker of the House, Charles McCall, to petition the Oklahoma Supreme
Court to rule the compacts invalid. 17 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
subsequently heard the case and ruled the compacts with the Comanche
Nation and the Otoe-Missouria Tribe invalid under Oklahoma law. 18
Undeterred by the ruling of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the Defendant
Tribes sought approval from the Secretary of the Interior of the New
Compacts, arguing that the Oklahoma Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction
over them and the New Compacts.19 The Secretary of the Interior took no
action on the filings by the Defendant Tribes, resulting in their approval by
default.20 The Plaintiff Tribes responded by filing another federal lawsuit
challenging the New Compacts and the action of the Secretary of the
Interior in approving the New Compacts, which is the focus of this Note. 21
This latest suit was filed in the federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
against the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior, Governor Stitt, and the Defendant Tribes. 22
14. Cherokee Nation v. Stitt, 475 F. Supp. 3d 1277 (W.D. Okla. 2020).
15. Id. at 1283.
16. See sources cited infra note 166 and accompanying text.
17. Treat v. Stitt, 2020 OK 64, ¶ 1, 473 P.3d 43, 44.
18. Id. ¶ 8, 473 P.3d at 45.
19. Id. ¶ 2, 473 P.3d at 44.
20. Id. ¶ 2, 473 P.3d at 44; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) (providing the authority
for a tribal-state compact to be approved by default: “[i]f the Secretary does not approve or
disapprove the compact . . . before the date that is 45 days after the date on which the
compact is submitted . . . the compact shall be considered to have been approved by the
Secretary, but only to the extent the compact is consistent with the provisions of [IGRA]”).
21. Cherokee Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 1:20-cv-02167 (TJK) (D.D.C.
filed Aug. 7, 2020), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2020/08/26-amended-complaint.
pdf.
22. Randy Ellis, Four Oklahoma Tribes Ask Federal Court in Washington D.C. to Void
Two Gaming Compacts, OKLAHOMAN (Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.oklahoman.com/
article/5668636/four-oklahoma-tribes-ask-federal-court-in-washington-dc-to-void-twogaming-compacts.
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Thus, we arrive at the current state of affairs of Indian Gaming in the State
of Oklahoma. Part I of this Note introduces the tribal-state dispute, Part II
discusses the history of Indian Gaming in Oklahoma, and Part III discusses
the merits of the case brought against Governor Stitt, the Defendant Tribes,
and the Secretary of the Interior.
II. Indian Gaming in Oklahoma
A. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Commercial Indian gaming has operated in the United States since the
1970s.23 During the 1970s, Congress was silent about how states should
treat Indian gaming within their borders. However, after the Supreme
Court’s decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, which
ruled that California state law could not regulate gaming on Indian land
within California, Congress decided it needed to find a solution to regulate
Indian gaming that would be beneficial to both the tribes and the states. 24
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to “regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with
Indian tribes.”25 Thus, in 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA). 26
1. The Breakdown of Tribal Gaming
Congress enacted the IGRA in an effort to create a regulatory scheme for
tribal gaming that would “balance state, federal, and tribal interests.” 27
IGRA sought to provide tribes with a “statutory basis for the operation of
gaming”28 as well as to “shield [the Indian tribes] from organized crime and
other corrupting influences”29 in order to facilitate the ultimate goal of
“promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments.”30

23. Hicham Raache, IN FOCUS: Origins of Native American Gaming, KFOR (July 28,
2020), https://kfor.com/digital-first/in-focus-origins-of-native-american-gaming/.
24. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
25. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
26. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721.
27. Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing 25 U.S.C. §§
2701–2702).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
29. Id. § 2702(2).
30. Id. § 2702(1).
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IGRA broke tribal gaming down into three distinct classes. 31 Class I
gaming is defined as social gaming “for prizes of minimal value” or
traditional games related to traditional Indian ceremonies. 32 Class II gaming
is bingo and card games played for money that are authorized by the state,
not including any banking card games or any electronic game of chance or
slot machines. 33 Class III gaming is defined as all gaming that is not
covered in Class I and Class II, and includes traditional games that come to
mind when thinking of casinos, such as blackjack, roulette, and slot
machines. 34
IGRA applies to each class differently. “Class I gaming [conducted] on
Indian lands is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes” and as
such is not primarily regulated by IGRA. 35 Governance of gaming under
Class II is shared equally between the National Indian Gaming Commission
(NIGC) and the tribes. 36 Tribes must adopt a gaming ordinance that applies
the minimum requirements prescribed in IGRA and the NIGC Chairman
must approve the ordinance before any Class II gaming may occur. 37
2. Class III Gaming Requirements
Class III gaming is the most complex type of gaming to regulate and, as
a result, is dealt with extensively by IGRA. It is primarily governed by §
2710(d) of IGRA. 38 Class III gaming has three requirements that must be
met before any gaming is commenced. 39 The first requirement is that the
gaming be “authorized by a tribal ordinance or resolution that has been
approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission, a regulatory body
created by IGRA with rulemaking and enforcement authority.” 40 The
second requirement mandates that the “Indian lands where the gaming []
take[s] place must be located within a state that permits gaming ‘for any
purpose by any person, organization, or entity.’” 41 Lastly, the third

31. Id. § 2703.
32. Id. § 2703(6).
33. Id. § 2703(7).
34. Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
35. Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 466 F.3d 134, 135
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1)).
36. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(2), (b)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 136 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)).
39. Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 376.
40. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(a), (2)(C)).
41. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B)).
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requirement dictates that gaming must conform to a compact between the
tribe and the state in which the gaming will occur. 42
IGRA mandates various obligations that tribes and states must follow
while negotiating compacts. First, the compact must only consider Class III
gaming; thus, bargaining for Class I and II gaming in the compact is
prohibited. 43 Next, IGRA provides permissible subjects that may be
negotiated.44 These subjects include:
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and
regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly
related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such
activity;
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between
the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of
such laws and regulations;
(iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such
amounts as are necessary to defray the costs of regulating such
activity;
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts
comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable
activities;
(v) remedies of breach of contracts;
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and
maintenance of the gaming facility, including licensing; and
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the
operation of gaming activities. 45
The statute expressly provides that, except assessments necessary to
defray regulatory amounts, § 2710(d) does not give the state the authority to
“impose any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe.” 46
Accordingly, the state has no authority to impose such taxation on tribal
gaming as the general rule is that “the Indians’ exemption from state taxes
[is] lifted only when Congress has made its intention to do so unmistakably
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
Id. § 2710(a)(1), (2).
Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C).
Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)-(vii).
Id. § 2710(d)(4).
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clear.”47 However, despite this limitation, courts, as well as the Department
of the Interior, have held compacts valid that allow the state to exact fees
from tribes where those “fees” are structured as exclusivity fees. 48 In doing
so, those courts placed an emphasis on the word “impose” and will allow
for fairly negotiated exclusivity fees with a deemed benefit for the tribe or
tribes, as the courts reasoned such fair exchange would not fall under the
definition of “impose.”49 “Although [a] state [does] not have [the] authority
to exact [revenue sharing or other payments from tribes relating to their
gaming operations], it [can] bargain to receive them in exchange for a quid
pro quo benefit conferred in the compact.”50 The courts reasoned that if the
exclusivity fees sought by the state were accompanied by significant
economic benefit conferred to the tribes, then such fees would be
permissible. 51
Ultimately, the Secretary of the Interior (the “Secretary”) has the
authority to determine the validity and reasonableness of exclusivity fees in
a tribal-state compact.52 The Secretary has traditionally required that the
state confer an economic benefit to the tribe that “the State is not required
to negotiate under IGRA” for exclusivity fees to be valid. 53 Such economic
benefit includes the right to exclusively engage in Class III gaming
activities. 54 Thus, if the tribe and the state enter into significant negotiation
where the state confers an “extra” economic benefit on the tribe, exclusivity
fees can be permitted.
3. The Role of the Secretary
Once the state and tribe have entered into a compact, it is sent to the
Secretary for approval.55 IGRA requires that for a compact to be operable, it
must go into “effect.”56 To be effective, the Secretary must approve a

47. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985).
48. See In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Idaho v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2006).
49. Indian Gaming, 331 F.3d at 1111 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(4)).
50. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 465 F.3d at 1101.
51. Id. at 1101–02.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
53. Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Rincon Reservation v. Schwarzenegger,
602 F.3d 1019, 1039 (9th Cir. 2009).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1056.
56. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
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legally entered into compact and publish a notice of the approval in the
Federal Register.57
Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(A) gives the Secretary the explicit authority
to “approve any Tribal-State compact entered into between an Indian tribe
and a State governing gaming on Indian lands of such Indian tribe.” 58
Further, IGRA gives the Secretary explicit disapproval rights. 59 The
Secretary “may disapprove a compact . . . only if [the] compact violates”:
any provision of IGRA, any provision of federal law that does not relate to
tribal gaming, or the trust obligation the United States owes Indians. 60 The
scope of these disapproval rights were addressed in Amador County,
California v. Salazar, where the court reasoned that it was “implausible that
Congress intended ‘may’ to confer [] complete discretion.”61 Further, the
court determined that “‘may’ is best read to limit the circumstances in
which disapproval is allowed. 62 The Secretary must, however, disapprove a
compact if it would violate any of the three limitations in that
subsection . . . .”63 Thus, the Secretary is obliged to deny any compact that
violates § 2710(d)(8)(B).64
Regulation under IGRA has added an additional requirement that the
compact be “legally entered into by both parties” for the compact to be
approved by the Secretary.65 Essentially, this is a question of tribal and state
law requiring that the tribe and state each possess the requisite legal
authority to enter into the compact.
IGRA also places a time requirement on the Secretary.66 The Secretary
has forty-five days after the compact is submitted to approve or disapprove
the compact.67 However, if the Secretary fails to make a decision within the
forty-five-day window, the compact is deemed automatically approved so
long as it is consistent with IGRA.68 The obligation of the Secretary to
disapprove compacts in violation of the three limitations set out in §
2710(d)(8)(B) is not waived if the Secretary provides approval by
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
Id. § 2710(d)(8)(A).
Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B).
Id.
640 F.3d 373, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Id.
Id.
See Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
25 C.F.R. § 293.7 (2009).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C).
Id.
Id.
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inaction.69 The court in Amador reasoned that “just as the Secretary has no
authority to affirmatively approve a compact that violates any of subsection
(d)(8)(B)’s criteria for disapproval, he may not allow a compact that
violates subsection (d)(8)(C)’s caveat to go into effect by operation of
law.”70
B. Oklahoma Tribal Gaming Before the STGA
Class III gaming did not exist in Oklahoma for many years after the
enactment of IGRA.71 Instead, most Indian gaming revolved around Class
II gaming, primarily bingo.72 Accordingly, during this period of gaming in
Oklahoma, IGRA was not important from a state perspective. 73 Gaming
was exclusively governed between the tribes and the NIGC, leaving the
state on the outside looking in, accruing no revenue from such activity.
The reason most gaming in Oklahoma during this period was focused on
Class II is because of the historical unwillingness of Oklahoma governors
to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribes of Oklahoma, likely as a
result of the fear of political repercussions from advocating for gaming in a
traditionally conservative Bible Belt state like Oklahoma. 74 The only Class
III gaming that was allowed before the STGA was pari-mutuel horse
racing. 75
After the Supreme Court ruling in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, in which
the Supreme Court determined Congress could not abrogate the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity by allowing tribes to sue a state that
refused to negotiate a Class III compact, the good-faith negotiation clause
of IGRA was essentially rendered useless. 76 Thus, the state could continue
refusing to negotiate with the tribes, which it did until the early 2000s. 77

69. Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 381.
70. Id.
71. D. Michael McBride III, Indian Gaming Compacts in Oklahoma: Respecting Tribal
Jurisdiction and Enforcing Understanding, INDIAN GAMING, May 2010, at 14, 14,
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/may10_mcbride-indian-gaming-compacts-inok-indian-gaming-ma.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. W. Dale Mason, Gaming, Indian, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OKLAHOMA HISTORY
AND CULTURE (Okla. Hist. Soc’y, 2009), https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.
php?entry=GA007 (online version of two-volume print edition).
75. Id.
76. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
77. Mason, supra note 74.
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Before the STGA, tribes “were effectively shut out of [Class III] gaming”
in Oklahoma.78
Because of the state’s stance on Class III gaming, the tribes’ Class II
gaming became even more contentious with the NIGC as the tribes’
“bingo” gaming machines began to look and act more and more like Class
III slot machines.79 The tribes sought to maximize the revenue from their
Class II gaming operations by developing innovative Class II gaming
technologies.80 Primarily, the tribes added digitalized, network bingo that
increased the number of players eligible to play.81 However, these
innovations in Class II gaming were met with strong opposition by the
NIGC in many instances. 82 As a result, legal battles arose around the
distinction between Class II and Class III gaming. 83 This was a tumultuous
period for tribal gaming in Oklahoma; gaming revenues were low and there
was friction between the Oklahoma Government, the NIGC, and the tribes
of Oklahoma. 84 However, the state’s reluctance to accept Class III gaming
did not dissuade the tribes as they negotiated with the state for a Class III
compact.85 Finally, in 2004, the tribes’ hard work paid off.
In 2004, new negotiations began between the tribes and recently elected
Governor Brad Henry. 86 Governor Henry, unlike most prior Oklahoma
governors, was vocal about his willingness to engage in tribal gaming
negotiations.87 With his support and encouragement, Senate Bill 1252,
containing the Model Compact, which he had negotiated with the tribes,
was passed by the Oklahoma state legislature and submitted to the voters as
a state question. 88 This legislation significantly expanded the scope of Class
III gaming in Oklahoma beyond just horse racing and is better known now
as the State-Tribal Gaming Act, or the STGA. 89 The legislation was placed
on the ballot in Oklahoma as State Question 712 and was officially enacted
after substantial support from Oklahoma voters.90
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
McBride, supra note 71, at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Mason, supra note 74.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Oklahoma Tribal Gaming After the STGA
The STGA significantly impacted both state and tribal economic activity
in Oklahoma almost immediately.91 Within the first year, the state collected
around $2.3 million in exclusivity fees from the tribes. 92 The fees have
continued to grow substantially almost every year since, as a result of
increased gaming activity by the compacting tribes. 93 In 2019, the state
collected over $148 million in exclusivity fees from tribes engaged in Class
III gaming. 94 The $148 million in exclusivity fees were collected on over
$2.44 billion of Class III gaming revenue generated by the tribes. 95 As of
2018, thirty-one different tribes were operating 131 facilities offering Class
III gaming throughout Oklahoma.96
The STGA allows tribes to conduct Class III gaming activities, which
includes electronic gaming and non-house banked card games, and also
allows horse racetracks to conduct limited electronic gaming. 97 The STGA
offered federally recognized tribes in Oklahoma a model compact
permitting tribes to “engage in Class III gaming on tribal lands under the
terms and conditions of the proposed compact.”98 The state extended this
offer through a statutory “Model Compact” that set uniform terms, which
are offered to each federally recognized tribe. 99 If the individual tribe
decided to enter into a compact, the compact would be sent to the Secretary
of the Interior and go into effect pending approval pursuant to IGRA §
2710(d)(8)(a).100 Initially, in 2005, twenty-nine tribes entered into compacts
with the state.101 Currently, thirty-five tribes are compacted with the state to
conduct Class III gaming.102

91. OKLA. GAMING COMPLIANCE UNIT, OKLA. OFF. OF M GMT. & ENTER. SERVS.,
ANNUAL REPORT : FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 1 (n.d.) [hereinafter 2019 ANNUAL REPORT],
https://oklahoma.gov/content/dam/ok/en/omes/documents/GameCompAnnReport19FINAL.pdf.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 6.
97. 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 261-282 (West 2018).
98. Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., 315 P.3d 359, 361 (Okla. 2013).
99. 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281(2)(2).
100. Id.
101. See Compacted Tribes, OKLA. OFF. MGMT. & ENTER. SERVS., https://oklahoma.gov/
omes/gaming-compliance-unit/compacted-tribes.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
102. See id.
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Each tribe pays the state fees based on revenues derived under the
compact.103 The fees were attributed to the “substantial exclusivity”
afforded to the tribes by the state and the “special opportunities for tribal
economic opportunity through gaming within the external boundaries of
Oklahoma in respect to the covered games.” 104 The fees were set at:
a. four percent (4%) of the first Ten Million Dollars
($10,000,000.00) of adjusted gross revenues received by a tribe
in a calendar year from the play of electronic amusement games,
electronic bonanza-style bingo games and electronic instant
bingo games,
b. five percent (5%) of the next Ten Million Dollars
($10,000,000.00) of adjusted gross revenues received by a tribe
in a calendar year from the play of electronic amusement games,
electronic bonanza-style bingo games and electronic instant
bingo games,
c. six percent (6%) of all subsequent adjusted gross revenues
received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play of electronic
amusement games, electronic bonanza-style bingo games and
electronic instant bingo games, and
d. ten percent (10%) of the monthly net win of the common
pool(s) or pot(s) from which prizes are paid for nonhousebanked card games. The tribe is entitled to keep an amount equal
to state payments from the common pool(s) or pot(s) as part of
its cost of operating the games.105
Subject to this fee schedule, compacted tribes have paid upwards of $1.5
billion in exclusivity fees to the state since 2006. 106 While approving the
Compacts, the Secretary was required to determine the validity of the
exclusivity fees. 107 Accordingly, with his approval, the Secretary deemed
that the state conferred an extra benefit on the tribes by providing the
exclusive right to conduct Class III gaming within the state.
The Model Compacts set out an initial term of fifteen years, which was
set to expire on January 1, 2020.108 However, the agreement included an
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281(11)(A)(1).
Id. § 281(11)(A).
Id. § 281(11)(A)(2)(a)-(d).
2019 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 91, at 2.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281(15)(B) (West 2018).
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automatic renewal provision. 109 Section 15(B) provides, “This Compact
shall have a term which will expire on January 1, 2020, and at that time, if
organization licensees or others are authorized to conduct electronic
gaming . . . pursuant to any governmental action . . . , the Compact shall
automatically renew for successive additional fifteen-year terms . . . .”110
The section includes a renegotiation provision in which either the tribe or
the state, through its governor, may request to renegotiate terms related to
the scope of gaming under the compact and the exclusivity fees within 180
days of the expiration or renewal of the Compact.111
III. The Case: Cherokee Nation v. United States Department of the Interior
A. Statement of Facts
On September 14, 2020, the Cherokee Nation, the Chickasaw Nation, the
Choctaw Nation, and the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (the “Plaintiff Tribes”)
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
against the United States Department of Interior, the Secretary of the
Interior, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, the Comanche Nation, the
Otoe-Missouria Tribe, the UKB, and the KTT.112 The action seeks reversal
of the Secretary’s “arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful ‘no action’ approvals
under the [IGRA].”113 This lawsuit arises from several events that took
place in Oklahoma from the middle of 2019 through 2020.
On July 8, 2019, Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt wrote an op-ed in the
Tulsa World expressing his view that the state needed to renegotiate the
original compacts with the tribes and that the Model Compacts did not
automatically renew. 114 The article suggested that the Model Compacts
were outdated and needed to be renegotiated to “reflect[] market conditions
for the gaming industry seen around the nation today.” 115 Governor Stitt
incorrectly noted that the exclusivity fees provided for in the original
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. First Amended & Supplemented Complaint at 1-2, Cherokee Nation v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Interior, No. 1:20-cv-02167 (TJK) (D.D.C. filed Aug. 7, 2020), https://turtletalk.
files.wordpress.com/2020/08/26-amended-complaint.pdf.
113. Id. at 3 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C)).
114. Kevin Stitt, Opinion, Gov. Kevin Stitt: New Gaming Compacts Must Protect the
Interests of the Tribes and the State, TULSA WORLD (July 8, 2020), https://tulsaworld.
com/opinion/columnists/gov-kevin-stitt-new-gaming-compacts-must-protect-the-interests/
article_ae5596f7-e9e5-5613-9bbb-c6341af9259f.html.
115. Id.
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compacts are the lowest in the nation and took the position that those
expired at the end of 2019.116
The op-ed was met with frustration from the tribes and marked the start
of the current controversy. 117 The tribes asserted that the Model Compacts
were subject to automatic renewal and that only the exclusivity fees were
subject to renegotiation.118 Chief Gary Batton, of the Choctaw Nation,
stated that “[t]he governor’s op-ed was factually inaccurate in stating our
compact does not renew, which does not hold up on legal review, and he
seems to be unaware of just how beneficial tribes are to the state.” 119
As a result of this friction, on December 31, 2019, the Cherokee,
Chickasaw, and Choctaw nations filed a federal suit in the Western District
of Oklahoma seeking declaratory judgement that the Model Compacts were
set to automatically renew on January 1, 2020.120 Shortly after, the Citizen
Potawatomie Nation, the Comanche Nation, and the Otoe-Missouria Tribe,
among others, joined the case. 121
The federal judge in the case initially sent the parties to mediation in
order to attempt to work out a resolution. 122 During this time, the state
finalized terms for new gaming compacts with the Comanche Nation and
the Otoe-Missouria Tribe. 123 As a result, the two tribes filed motions to
dismiss their claims against Governor Stitt.124

116. Id.
117. Sean Murphy, Oklahoma Governor, Tribes Clash over Casino Gaming Revenue, AP
NEWS (July 10, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/4cdc21f7e721487e84d86b11898f3e56.
118. Id.
119. Gary Batton, Stitt Should Rethink Tribal Negotiations, CHOCTAW NATION (Aug. 10,
2021), https://www.choctawnation.com/news-events/press-media/stitt-should-rethink-tribalnegotiations.
120. Sean Murphy, 3 Tribes in Oklahoma Sue Governor over Casino Gambling, AP
NEWS (Dec. 31, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/18071c71ccdd085c545c842a80b47551.
121. Curtis Killman, Five More Tribes Ask to Join Lawsuit Against State over Gaming
Compact Status, TULSA WORLD (Feb. 14, 2020), https://tulsaworld.com/news/local/crimeand-courts/five-more-tribes-ask-to-join-lawsuit-against-state-over/article_33041fe2-6c2c5311-bb00-3efb2d400e2b.html.
122. Barbara Hoberock, Judge Orders Mediation Between Stitt, Tribes over Gaming
Compacts, TULSA WORLD (Fed. 11, 2020), https://tulsaworld.com/news/judge-ordersmediation-between-stitt-tribes-over-gaming-compacts/article_93c56995-da22-5658-a6b47015a03d2b7c.html.
123. Lenzy Krehbiel-burton, Two Oklahoma Tribes Pull Out of Compact Lawsuit, SW.
LEDGER (Lawton, Okla.) (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.southwestledger.news/news/twooklahoma-tribes-pull-out-compact-lawsuit.
124. Id.
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Ultimately, the federal judge ruled in favor of the tribes, stating that the
Model Compacts automatically renewed on January 1, 2020 under the
terms of the automatic renewal provisions. 125 In reaching this conclusion,
the court reasoned that a common law reading of the renewal clause in the
STGA required that the term “governmental action” be read consistently
with the common understanding of the term. 126 Accordingly, the court
reasoned, when the state authorized an executive agency to grant
organizational licenses and the agency subsequently granted such licenses,
“governmental action” was taken to authorize electronic gaming. 127 Thus,
when the tribes were granted updated licenses by the Oklahoma Horse
Racing Commission, a governmental agency, governmental action was
taken. As a result, the automatic renewal clause was triggered and the
Model Compacts were renewed for a subsequent fifteen-year term.
On April 21, 2020, after the federal judge had ordered the parties to
mediation in an attempt to resolve the tribes’ declaratory judgment action,
Governor Stitt announced the state had entered into two new gaming
compacts with the Comanche Nation and Otoe-Missouria Tribe.128 The
compacts were then submitted to the Department of the Interior and
subsequently approved through inaction by the Secretary pursuant to IGRA
§ 2710(d)(8)(C). 129 Soon after approval, the leaders of the Oklahoma
legislature petitioned the Oklahoma Supreme Court to invalidate these
compacts, claiming Governor Stitt lacked the authority to bind the state in
such compacts.130
These compacts allowed the compacting tribes to establish new gaming
operations outside of their traditional jurisdiction and within the
jurisdictions of other tribes located in the metropolitan areas of
Oklahoma.131 They also sought to permit certain forms of Class III gaming
that the state had yet to authorize, including house-banked card and table
games and event wagering.132 On July 21, 2020, the court ruled that because
the legislature had yet to authorize this type of Class III gaming, as required
by the STGA, the compacts were invalid.133
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Cherokee Nation v. Stitt, 475 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1283 (W.D. Okla. 2020).
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1283.
Press Release, Gov. Stitt Signs Two New Gaming Compacts, supra note 8.
Treat v. Stitt, 2020 OK 64, ¶ 3, 473 P.3d 43, 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7, 473 P.3d at 45.
Id.
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Despite the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling, the two tribes continued to
operate under the compacts.134 The tribes assert that the court did not have
jurisdiction over either of the tribes and, accordingly, the compacts are
valid.135
Then, on August, 20, 2020, Governor Stitt announced that the state
entered into two new compacts with the UKB and KTT tribes (collectively
with the Comanche and Otoe-Missouria Compacts, the “New
Compacts”).136 The terms of these compacts were similar to the previous
compacts entered into with the Comanche Nation and the Otoe-Missouria
Tribe; however, they excluded the provision allowing the tribes to conduct
event wagering and house-banked table and card games.137
This latest lawsuit is a result of the tribes proceeding under the New
Compacts. The Plaintiff Tribes are seeking a declaratory judgement that the
New Compacts have no legal effect because Governor Stitt improperly
entered into them under state law; that the agreements are, therefore, void
and legally unenforceable; and that the Secretary improperly approved
them. 138
B. The Allegations
The Plaintiff Tribes argue the New Compacts are not valid because
IGRA § 2710(d)(1)(C), (d)(2)(C) dictates that for a compact to be
enforceable it must be legally entered into by both sides.139 They allege that
the New Compacts present no source of Governor Stitt’s authority to bind
the state beyond his own claims. 140 Further, the Plaintiff Tribes allege that
Governor Stitt’s claim to such authority is patently false because of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling in Treat v. Stitt.141

134. Randy Ellis, Comanche Nation, Otoe-Missouria Tribe to Continue Operating Under
Compacts Deemed Invalid, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 4, 2020), https://tulsaworld.com/
comanche-nation-otoe-missouria-tribe-to-continue-operating-under-compacts-deemedinvalid/article_014c3a9e-0191-11eb-bb6a-4fea29c36f44.html.
135. Id.
136. Press Release, Gaming Compacts Deemed Approved, supra note 8.
137. Two Recent Oklahoma Tribal Gaming Compacts Deemed Approved by Department
of Interior, Stitt Says, KOCO NEWS (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.koco.com/article/tworecent-oklahoma-tribal-gaming-compacts-deemed-approved-by-department-of-interior-stittsays/33659397.
138. First Amended & Supplemented Complaint, supra note 112, at 7.
139. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C), (d)(2)(C)).
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id. (citing Treat v. Stitt, 2020 OK 64, 473 P.3d 43).
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The Plaintiff Tribes then argue that because IGRA requires the compacts
be legally entered into before going into effect, the Secretary was required
to disapprove the New Compacts.142 They allege that the Secretary’s
decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.”143 Accordingly,
the Plaintiff Tribes claim that the Secretary’s approval did not cure the
invalidity of the New Compacts because the Secretary is only authorized to
approve a compact that has been legally entered into, 144 and a compact
“deemed approved” by the Secretary is only considered approved to the
extent it is consistent with IGRA. 145
Additionally, the Plaintiff Tribes argue that the Secretary was required
by IGRA to disapprove the New Compacts because they contain several
provisions that are inconsistent with IGRA. 146 The Plaintiff Tribes allege
that the Comanche and Otoe-Missouria compacts were invalid under IGRA
§ 2710(d)(1)(B), which requires that the games allowed in the compacts be
permitted in the state which the compact will go into effect. 147 The two
agreements permit the tribes to conduct event wagering, house-banked table
and card games, and any other new games Governor Stitt approves at any
time in his discretion. 148 These forms of gaming, the Plaintiff Tribes allege,
are not allowed under Oklahoma law and thus violate IGRA. 149
The Plaintiff Tribes also contend that the exclusivity payment provisions
of all four New Compacts are invalid as the state did not give any
meaningful concessions of economic benefit to the tribes in return for the
additional revenue. 150 The Plaintiff Tribes argue that the Secretary has
consistently required that the state give up a meaningful concession of
economic benefit and that by gaining increased profit-sharing percentages
without any additional economic benefits conferred onto the tribes, the new
exclusivity payment provisions should be ruled invalid. 151
Finally, the Plaintiff Tribes argue that all four of the New Compacts
violate IGRA by requiring the Governor of Oklahoma to commit to future
off-reservation trust land acquisitions for gaming purposes. 152 The Plaintiff
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(8)(A), (d)(8)(C)).
Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C)).
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 5 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id.
Id. at 6.
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Tribes allege that commitments in the Comanche, Otoe-Missouria, and
KTT agreements apply to off-reservation trust land acquisitions by the three
tribes within Chickasaw and Potawatomi Nation’s territory. 153 Because of
this, the complaint contends that the agreements “threaten[] the Chickasaw
Nation’s and Citizen Potawatomi Nation’s jurisdictional integrity and
sovereignty, and jeopardizes their ability to generate gaming revenue within
their own territory.”154
IV. The Court Should Declare the New Compacts Invalid
The district court should rule the New Compacts invalid because each
compact was entered into invalidly under Oklahoma law and in violation of
IGRA. Accordingly, the Secretary was required by law to rule them
invalid. 155 The Secretary’s no-action ruling is subject to judicial review and
should be reversed under the Administrative Procedure Act because the
challenged action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 156 Further, in Amador, the court
determined that when “a plaintiff alleges that a compact violates IGRA,
thus requiring the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the APA
precludes judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval.” 157
Accordingly, the Plaintiff Tribes’ allegations may be heard by the court.
A. Governor Stitt Lacked the Authority to Bind the State to Compacts
Inconsistent with the State-Tribal Gaming Act
1. The Comanche and Otoe-Missouria Compacts Were Not Legally
Entered Into by Both Parties
There are two requirements for a compact to be valid: the compact must
be “validly ‘entered into’ under applicable state law” and the compact
“must be ‘in effect’ pursuant to Secretarial approval and notice.” 158 In
Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, a case strikingly similar to the one at hand,
the Tenth Circuit determined that a state-tribal compact was never validly
entered into, despite the compact having Secretarial approval, after the New
Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the New Mexico Governor lacked the
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8).
156. Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 204 F. Supp. 3d 212, 244
(D.D.C. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
157. Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
158. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1553 (10th Cir. 1997).
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authority to enter into the compacts. 159 Accordingly, the court held that the
compact could not go into effect because the compact did not satisfy one of
the aforementioned requirements for a valid compact. 160 In coming to this
conclusion the court reasoned that state law, not federal, determines “the
procedures by which a state may validly enter into a compact.”161
Much like the circumstances in Kelly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
ruled in Treat v. Stitt that Governor Stitt lacked the authority to enter into
the Comanche and Otoe-Missouria Compacts because they purported to
allow the two tribes to conduct “house-banked card and table games and
event-wagering,” which is not permitted under the STGA. 162 As a result of
that ruling, and following the analysis in Kelly, the Comanche and OtoeMissouria Compacts are not valid because they were not “validly ’entered
into’ under applicable state law.”163 The New Compacts are required to
follow the guidelines of the STGA because the state determined that they
govern the “procedures” for entering into a valid compact. In Treat, the
court reasoned that the STGA “sets forth the terms and conditions under
which the State’s federally recognized tribes can engage in Class III
gaming.”164 Thus, any inconsistencies between the STGA and the Compacts
make the Compacts fall short of satisfying the Kelly requirements.
2. All Four Compacts Are Invalid Because Governor Stitt Was Not
Authorized by the Legislature to Negotiate the Compacts
State law determines the process by which the state, through its
governor, may negotiate and enter into tribal gaming compacts.165 Thus,
determining whether a state governor has the authority to enter into a
compact with a tribe depends solely on the authority vested in the governor
by the laws of the state. In 2004, a question was submitted to the Attorney
General of Oklahoma asking whether the Governor can compact with
tribes, and in so doing, bind the state to each compact without legislative
approval. 166 The answer was yes. 167 Oklahoma law gives the Governor the
authorization to negotiate and enter into “cooperative agreements on behalf
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
2020 OK 64, ¶ 5, 473 P.3d 43, 44.
104 F.3d at 1553.
473 P.3d at 44.
See Kelly, 104 F.3d at 1553.
Op. Okla. Att’y Gen. No. 2004-27 (Aug. 26, 2004), 2004 WL 2002612.
Id. at 7.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

174

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

of this state with federally recognized Indian tribal governments within
th[e] state.”168 Further, the Attorney General determined that requiring
legislative approval for such agreements would violate the separation of
powers clause in the Oklahoma Constitution. 169 However, there was a
caveat included in this decision. The Attorney General noted that any
agreement the Governor negotiated must conform to the public policy
enacted by the legislature.170 In the words of Attorney General Mike
Hunter: “This Office’s longstanding analysis of state law endures: the
Governor has the authority to negotiate compacts with Indian tribes but he
cannot bind the state to any such compact if doing so authorizes activity
prohibited by state law or would otherwise be contrary to state law.” 171
Governor Stitt only has the authority to compact with tribes in a manner
consistent with Oklahoma law—here, the STGA.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court established the precise bounds of the
Governor’s authority in Treat by declaring that “[t]he Governor has the
statutory authority to negotiate gaming compacts with Indian tribes to
assure the State receives its share of revenue.” 172 This declaration of
gubernatorial power comes directly from the STGA. 173 Part 15(B) of the
Model Compact, enacted by the Oklahoma legislature as the exclusive
means to govern tribal gaming, permits the Governor to seek to renegotiate
the exclusivity rates of a compact if requested within 180 days of
expiration.174 Therefore, the Governor’s authority is limited to negotiating
for changes in exclusivity fees if such negotiations are requested within the
temporal limits prescribed.
Governor Stitt lacked the authority to bind the state to the New
Compacts because he exceeded the scope of his authority by including in
each New Compact terms that are not consistent with the STGA or the
Model Compacts. As mentioned above, the Comanche and Otoe-Missouria
Compacts included Class III games in Covered Gaming that are not
permitted by Oklahoma law or the STGA. Further, all four New Compacts
included changes in how the compact would regulate each tribe’s gaming,
including an illusory promise for future off-reservation trust land
agreements by future governors that is absent in the Model Compact, an
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

74 OKLA. STAT. § 1221(C)(1) (2011).
Op. Okla. Att’y Gen. No. 2004-27, at 3 (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. 4, § 1).
Id. at 7 n.3.
Op. Okla. Att’y Gen. No. 2020-8, at 7 (May 5, 2020), 2020 WL 2304499.
Treat v. Stitt, 2020 OK 64, ¶ 3, 473 P.3d 43, 44.
3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281 (West 2018).
Id.
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attempt to alter the requirements for disputes and tort claims of the Model
Compact, as well as purported changes to various other provisions
throughout the document.175 This is not to say that the terms included in the
New Compact are better or worse; rather, the legislative process is the only
way these changes can be legally made. Therefore, Governor Stitt exceeded
his authority and the New Compacts are not binding on the state.
B. The Compacts Violate IGRA, Thus Requiring Secretarial Disapproval
1. The Comanche and Otoe-Missouria Compacts Purported to Allow
Gaming That Is Not Permitted Within Oklahoma
The Comanche and Otoe-Missouria Compacts should be held invalid
because they violate § 2710(d)(1)(B) by allowing the tribes to conduct
“house-banked table and cards games” and “event-wagering,” which are not
permitted in Oklahoma “for any purpose by any person, organization, or
entity.”176 As established above, the STGA is the sole guide as to how tribal
gaming in Oklahoma may be lawfully carried out. The STGA provides for
which types of games may be conducted by tribes. It does so in the
“covered game” definition of the Model Compact, which permits the
following:
an electronic bonanza-style bingo game, an electronic
amusement game, an electronic instant bingo game, nonhousebanked card games; any other game, if the operation of such
game by a tribe would require a compact and if such game has
been: (i) approved by the Oklahoma Horse Racing Commission
for use by an organizational licensee, (ii) approved by state
legislation for use by any person or entity, or (iii) approved by
amendment of the State-Tribal Gaming Act; and upon election
by the tribe by written supplement to this Compact, any Class II

175. See generally Kialegee Tribal Town and State of Oklahoma Gaming Compact (July
1, 2020), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/pdf/508%20Compliant%20
2020.09.08%20Kialegee%20Tribal%20Town%20State%20of%20Oklahoma%20Gaming%2
0Compact_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN5K-Z4GF]; Otoe-Missouria Tribe and State of
Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 11; United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians
and State of Oklahoma Gaming Compact (July 1, 2020), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.
gov/files/assets/as-ia/oig/pdf/508%20Compliant%20%20United%20Keetoowah%20Band
%20Compact%20July%201%2C%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A7F-2DNT]; Comanche
Nation and State of Oklahoma Gaming Compact, supra note 11.
176. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
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game in use by the tribe, provided that no exclusivity payments
shall be required for the operation of such Class II game . . . .177
In 2018, this definition was amended, through the legislative process, to
further include “non-house-banked table games.”178 There has yet to be an
amendment that includes “event-wagering” or “house-banked table and
card games.” Accordingly, those types of games were not, and are not,
permitted under Oklahoma law. Due to the games’ illegality under state
law, their inclusion necessarily violates § 2710(d)(1)(B).
2. All Four New Compacts Violate IGRA by Purporting to Promise
Future Governors to Concur in Future Off-Reservation Trust Land
Acquisitions by the Tribes
All four New Compacts should be held invalid because they include
provisions regarding future off-reservation trust land acquisitions, which is
outside the scope of permissible compact provisions under IGRA.179 Each
compact included a provision entitled “Section 20 Concurrence” in which
Governor Stitt agreed all future governor or governors of Oklahoma would
consent to any determination by the Secretary as to specified future lands
being taken into trust for gaming purposes.180 Oklahoma law does not
permit a current governor to bind future governors in the exercise of their
executive discretion and authority. 181
Additionally, § 2710(d)(3)(C) establishes seven permissible provisions
that may be included in tribal-state gaming compacts.182 Notably, the sixth
and seventh provisions include a “catch-all.”183 Courts have interpreted the
catch-all to allow for any other term that is either a standard for operation of
a gaming activity or is directly related to the operation of gaming activities
to be included in a compact.184 The Supreme Court, in Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Community, a case where the Court determined the scope of an
IGRA cause of action, construed Class III gaming activity as “just what it
sounds like—the stuff involved in playing class III games.” 185
177. 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281 (West 2018).
178. Id. § 280.1.
179. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).
180. See sources cited supra note 175.
181. See 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281 (West 2018).
182. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).
183. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(6)-(7).
184. See, e.g., Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Newsom, 919 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2019).
185. Id. at 1153 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 792
(2014)).
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The question then becomes whether future off-reservation trust land
provisions should be considered as a standard for operation of a gaming
activity or considered to be directly related to the operation of gaming
activities. The obvious answer is no. First, future land acquisitions have no
effect in the standards for operation of any gaming activity or the
maintenance of any gaming facility. A promise by the Governor to assent to
the potential Secretarial approval of acquiring off-reservation trust land
does not in any way relate to the standards of operation for gaming
activities or the maintenance of gaming facilities. Following the definition
in Bay Mills, the standards of operations and maintenance must be for the
actual games being conducted, not the future promise of potential land.
Second, future land acquisitions are not directly related to the operation of
gaming activities. Similar to the first catch-all provision, land
acquisitions—regardless of the ultimate intent—do not impact how gaming
is operated by the tribes. Because these provisions do not fall into either of
the catch-all provisions, or any of the other § 2710(d)(3)(C) provisions,
they are outside the scope of permissible compact terms under IGRA and
should have been ruled invalid by the Secretary.
3. The Secretary Was Required by Law to Disapprove of the Compacts
Section 2710(d)(8) details the manner in which the Secretary may
approve or disapprove compacts submitted for approval. 186 Section
2710(d)(8)(B) establishes that the compact may be disapproved if it
violates: any provision of IGRA, any other provision of federal law, or the
trust obligations of the United States to Indians. 187 Courts have interpreted
this provision to limit the circumstances where disapproval is allowed, but
maintain that the Secretary is required to disapprove any compact that
violates any of the limitations provided. 188 Section 2710(d)(8)(C) sets out
that if the Secretary does not approve or disapprove a compact within fortyfive days of receiving the application, the compact shall be considered to be
approved, but only to the extent the provisions are consistent with IGRA. 189
Courts have held that this provision does not excuse the Secretary’s
obligation to disapprove illegal compacts.190 In Amador, the court reasoned
that “just as the Secretary has no authority to affirmatively approve a
compact that violates any of subsection (d)(8)(B)’s criteria for disapproval,
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8).
Id. § 2710(d)(8)(B).
See, e.g., Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
25 U.S.C § 2710(d)(8)(C).
See, e.g., Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 381.
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he may not allow a compact that violates subsection (d)(8)(C)’s caveat to
go into effect by operation of law.” 191 The courts are clear that no IGRA
provision provides the Secretary protection for letting illegal compacts go
into effect. Thus, the court should hold the Secretary accountable for failing
to disapprove illegal compacts and allowing them to go into effect by
operation of law.
V. Potential Implications
Tribal gaming in the State of Oklahoma, and across the country, faces
potentially significant adverse consequences as a result of this dispute.
Although there are several technical issues involved, the primary issues
have to do with how much power a governor has in state-tribal negotiations
and the duty of the Secretary to uphold the clear statutory standards of
IGRA. Depending on how the court rules, state governors can potentially
gain significant power to dictate how tribal gaming operates in their states
without regard to legislative authority or even the mandates of IGRA. This
would represent a significant shift from Congress’ intended balance of
power between the tribes and the states’ governors. Is the governor to be
bound by the state legislature regarding agreements with tribes, or is the
governor to be given inherent authority to unilaterally negotiate on behalf
of the state without regard to IGRA? The State of Oklahoma has
determined its stance, but will the federal court agree?

191. Id.
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